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ABSTRACT 
 
  Three factors, advent of new technology (HYV), development of infrastructure 
and market liberalization working in tandem have delivered favorable food security 
outcomes for Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s food-policy has benefited from a liberalized 
trade regime and a consistent downsizing of the government, all with favorable effects on 
poverty and nutrition. Post liberalization, the findings suggest a perceptible increase in 
the cost-effectiveness of the public food grain distribution system (PFDS). The favorable 
effects of liberalization are also evident in growths in outputs, market size, the size of 
private stocks, the emergence of a two peak harvest seasonality, and finally in declining 
real rice prices.  The government has moreover downsized the PFDS, making poverty-
reduction a priority basis for grain allocation. While imports relative to total availability 
have remained virtually unchanged during the last 25 years, public issue relative to the 
availability has fallen  by about a half.  Average food grain consumption has fallen 
slightly during the 1990s but in face of rising incomes, this could partly be driven by 
diversifying tastes. Comparing the efficiency of the private and the public sector, the 
private marketing margin is slightly higher. In spite of the significant advantage(s) 
enjoyed by the public sector, the margin being thin is significant. In order to account for 
the expected global changes under the Doha round, simulations using competitive spatial-
equilibrium models for the world’s rice and wheat markets forecast increase in prices for 
rice and wheat by 21.7% and 10.1% respectively by 2013.  USDA global CGE models 
(2001) show figures of increase in wheat prices by 18.1%, and rice prices by 10.1%.    ii
These estimates are used in a multi-market model for Bangladesh as estimates for global 
price shocks.  Sensitivity analysis shows that over a range of values involving both an 
upper and a lower limit, small declines will occur in real incomes and caloric levels of 
both urban poor and rural landless households, while large farms will experience a small 
gain in their real incomes.  Based on values corresponding to the lower limit, overall 
effects on food security are however quite small. 
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LIBERALIZATION AND FOOD SECURITY IN BANGLADESH: HOW THE 
GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETS DELIVERED? 
 
Nuimuddin Chowdhury
1, Nasir Farid 




The common perception of Bangladesh is of a flood prone poor country beset 
with acute governance problems. Despite these perceptions, Bangladesh has done well in 
some important aspects. In particular, Bangladesh has done fairly well in managing its 
food and agricultural policies over the last quarter of a century. The policies, especially 
those pertaining to liberalization, agricultural R&D and physical infrastructure building 
have created notable gains and one of the highest growth rates in the size of food grains 
markets in South Asia.      
Government interventions in food grain markets in South Asia were formed 
against a backdrop of the infamous Bengal famine of 1943 in which millions died. The 
driving policy mindset was since conditioned by (a) a low production base of rain-fed, 
fragile mono-crop staples cultivation (b) fragmented infrastructure, financial and 
informational networks; (c) thin market supplies displaying high prices, large seasonal 
spreads in prices and susceptibility to upward spikes at short notice. In 1950/51, 
Bangladesh’s rice production per capita was only 60% of 2000 and the seasonal spread in 
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rice price was greater than 40%. Scarcities were rife and crop failures often brought 
dreadful political fallouts. The interventions thus resulted from a syndrome of scarcity, 
pre-dating the green revolution. Conceived by the bureaucrats and politicians with the 
probable backing of wholesalers, (with typically high incidence of leakage, they were de 
facto beneficiaries of subsidies on food grains), the public distribution system was 
expansive, expensive, hugely loss making but yet a political holy-grail.  
The technologies, infrastructure and the markets have come a long way in 
Bangladesh since the shadows of famine and starvation (Ahmed, Haggblade and 
Chowdhury, 2000). Importantly, the governments have evolved in their mindset 
alongside. In the new millennium, the liberalization of agricultural markets has also 
started taking a global dimension with the launch of the Doha Round. Any discussion of 
food policy in Bangladesh must therefore deal with these expected changes in the global 
trade regime.   
Bangladesh government, bowing to the general trend of liberalization, began to 
liberalize extensively since the early 1990s. Prior to that, plant-breeding research and 
infrastructure development were accelerated throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Border 
protection on manufactured goods was lowered earlier. Both agricultural inputs and 
output markets were liberalized between 1988 and 1993; private imports of fertilizer and 
both grains (rice and wheat) were legalized in 1993; anti-hoarding act was put into 
abeyance and private traders could now seek institutional credit for carrying inventory.  
This paper attempts to assess the fallout of these policy changes on food security 
in Bangladesh. It analyzes the evolution of the food policy and outcomes in Bangladesh   3
in terms of the policy transition and the changes in private and public response to the 
changes. The discussion points to highly favorable responses of the private sector to the 
actions by the government. The responses of the private sector to liberalization are 
manifested in terms of growing food grain output, increasing size and commercialization 
of rice markets, private rice stocks becoming the mainstay of Bangladesh’s sourcing of 
grain requirements and the near take over of the rice imports by the private sector after 
the legalization of private imports. Next, it discusses the behavior of rice and wheat 
prices in terms of their trends, inter-year variability and intra-year seasonality. These 
variables are important indicators of food security and it is important to assess their 
behavior post liberalization to evaluate the food security outcomes from liberalization. 
Liberalization has resulted in a much greater role of the private sector. The comparative 
analysis of the public and private sectors shows that the private sector is comparably 
efficient in terms of marketing margins.  
Further, the paper analyzes the potential impact of the Doha round negotiations on 
the food security outcomes in Bangladesh. Simulations using competitive spatial-
equilibrium models for the world’s rice and wheat markets forecast increase in prices for 
rice and wheat. The estimates of price increases are used in a multi-market model of 
Bangladesh as estimates for global price shocks.  Sensitivity analysis shows that over a 
range of values involving both a upper and a lower limit, small declines will occur in real 
incomes and caloric levels of both urban poor and rural landless households, while large 
farms will experience a small gain in their real incomes.  Based on values corresponding 
to the lower limit, overall effects on food security are however quite small.   4
The paper is organized into seven sections. Section 2 documents the response of 
the public and private sector to the changing policy regime. Section 3 looks at the prices 
of rice and wheat in terms of their trends, inter-temporal variability, seasonality and 
comparative (relative to international benchmark prices) variability of rice and wheat 
prices in Bangladesh. Section 4 presents the food security outcomes in terms of national 
aggregates of food consumption and also in terms of the equalization of consumption 
across incomes classes. Section 5 compares the public and private sector average 
marketing margins incorporating several relevant dimensions like operating scales and 
capitalization, inventory-to-turnover ratio and government-failure issues. Section 6 
presents the results of a modeling exercise to ascertain the prospective impact of the 
Doha Round on world rice and wheat prices. Subsequently, a multi market model is used 
to trace the effect of those price changes on Bangladesh economy. Section 7 presents the 
summary and major conclusions from the paper. 
2.  CHARACTERIZATION OF BANGLADESH’S FOOD GRAINS ECONOMY  
Table 1 marks the transition of Bangladesh’s food and agricultural policy during 
the period of 1979-2004. Based on the components of policy transition, it is accurate to 
say that Bangladesh has elements of pro-poor economic growth and an active green 
revolution led by high-yielding rice varieties, large investments in physical infrastructure 
including irrigation and ready availability of fertilizer. In this respect, Bangladesh mostly 
shows similarities to Indonesia (Timmer, 2004).   5
Table 1—Milestones in agricultural and food policy transition, 1979 – 1996 
Date  Important milestones  
September, 
1979 
The World Bank produced an important document, Food Policy Issues (World Bank 1979) 
that framed all the major policy and analytical issues in managing Bangladesh’s food sector. 
The report cited optimal national stocks as equal to 1.5 million metric tonnes (MMT) as on 
July 1 of every year and 1.2 MMT as on Nov. 15 of every year. Security stocks the size of 
600,000 MT were cited as “appropriate”. 
1981  With the launch of the country’s Second Five Year Plan, government adopted an ambitious 
long-term plan for accelerating the growth rate of rice production. 
1982  Food Policy Monitoring Unit (FPMU) is established based on the recommendation in the 
Food Policy Issues.  
1986  A study led by Beacon Consultants that carried out the first-ever evaluation of the welfare 
effects of both Statutory Rationing and Modified Rationing demonstrated the inequities of 
the operation of both channels. 
1988  Pursuant to PL-TITLE III signed in 1988, Open Market Sales (OMS) came into vogue in 
Bangladesh. Now, in the event of the market price rising over a meaningful threshold, OMS 
grains would get disproportionately distributed in poor neighborhoods in order to foster self-
selection of the grains being off-loaded. In July 1988. The government waived the 
standardization requirement on imported irrigation equipment, thus allowing cheap imports 
from China and South Korea. This change is largely believed to have decisively spurred the 
growth of rice production. 
 
1989  The Modified Rationing (MR) was replaced by Palli Rationing under which rice was no 
longer to be distributed in rural areas but wheat would be distributed to small milling units. 
Each licensee mill would receive about 500 kgs of wheat per month: they would then sell 
the atta to villagers at a pre-set price; The government instituted Palli Rationing to distribute 
subsidized food grain (at 25%) to eligible households in rural areas. PR soon became the 
single most important public distribution channel for rice. Significantly, the PR was poorly 
targeted (Ahmed, 1992). It distributed rice during all months, including harvest ones. 
March 1989. Direct sales of urea by parastatal fertilizer factories to private traders was 
allowed for the first time, enabling a rapidly increasing number of private traders to move 
large quantities of area across the country (Samad et al. 1989). Previously, wholesale urea 
trade was a parastatal monopoly.  
The government started a new procurement program called mill gate Purchase (MP). The 
idea was to procure milled rice from pre-qualified contractor-mills at a cost-plus basis that 
pivots around the “procurement price” (PP). For a marketing agent, access to a MP contract 
readily implied secured access to implicit credit subsidies (Chowdhury, 1994). Also, the PP 
easily exceeded the going price during procurement season, due to the generous provisions 
of the scheme (such as highly favorable milling ratio). The MP was a lucrative for mill-
owners who received qualification. Rice procurement rose during 1989/90 to 1991/92 to 
record levels. 
1989/90. The government procures record quantities of rice during both aman and boro 
seasons. Millgate Purchase (MP), highly profitable to the contractors distorted incentives in 
milling and trade. Previously all millers and traders competed in one national rice market, 
the MP created incentives for local rent seeking. 
Notes: This table includes only landmark food policy changes. After 1996, it can be argued that there are 
no policy changes with far reaching impact on food markets.   6
Table 1—Milestones in agricultural and food policy transition, 1979 – 2004 -con’t. 
1991  The government suspends PR. This aggravated the public rice stocks to swell as well. PP was raised 
to Tk. 240, even though the single most important distribution channel had been terminated. 
1992  Statutory Rationing (SR), which entitled each card-holder to weekly grains from licensed dealers 
within the limits of six SR cities, was abolished. The abolition was received without any public 
outcry, indicating that there was a realization of mistargeting among the masses. 
Private imports of fertilizer of all types were legalized for the first time. 
1993  Import of wheat by private mills was legalized. Imports of foundation seeds and power-tillers were 
liberalized. 
1993  Private wheat imports by licensed large mills and private rice imports were legalized.  
1994  The 50 year old anti-hoarding act barring merchants from keeping inventories exceeding 1 week 
working stocks without statutory licenses from the Food Department was put into abeyance.  
1996  Bangladesh implements the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Tariff rates were bound at a 
much higher level relative to where they were applied. Bangladesh’s aggregate measure of support 
was way below the de minimis level as per WTO rules 
 
The liberalization of the fertilizer and minor irrigation equipment occurred during 
1988-1992 (Table 1). These twin reforms produced a concentrated impact and provided a 
significant fillip to the area under irrigation during the dry season resulting in a positive 
rice output response.
4 The trend growth rate in rice production of 2.98% during 1981 – 
2004 outstripped population growth and the growth rate was substantially higher in the 
post-liberalization period. Similarly, the trend growth of 2.7% in overall food grains 
production outstripped population growth rate. Per-capita market supply of rice grew at 
1.3% during 1981-2004 (Table 2), while the corresponding number for all food grains 
was 0.91% (largely because the supply of wheat was lagging behind). The share of boro 
rice in the total has grown rapidly while the share of aman rice has declined (Chowdhury 
1994).  
                                                 
4 This phenomenon has been widely documented; see Hossain (1988), Ahmed (2000) and Dorosh et al. 
(2004).    7
Table 2—Growth rates in pre- and post-liberalization periods (%) 
Source: DAM and FPMU 
  
  Treating 1992/93 as the start of liberalization, the post-liberalization period 
has witnessed acceleration in the growth of supply as well as production. In most cases, 
there is almost a doubling of the growth rates post-liberalization. While the share of 
public distribution in national availability of food grains has fallen in the post-
liberalization period, the share of food grain imports has remained virtually unchanged. 
The lion’s share of the food grain imports post liberalization comprised private imports. 
The rice yields in Bangladesh have grown at 2.69% annually while area growth 
has been 0.02% a year.
5 In case of HYVs, in contrast, the dominant factor has been area 
growth. Segregating yield growth performance between high-yielding varieties (HYVs) 
and all rice among the three major strains (aus, aman and boro), there are noticeable 
differences in the growth experience. For all three strains, the HYVs are outpaced by the 
                                                 
5 All India rice yield rates for a similar time-period is also 2.67%.  
Growth rate of rice and all-food grains   1980/81- 1992/93  1993/94- 
2003/04 
Rice production  2.61  4.78 
Rice market supply  2.68  4.83 
Food grain production  2.46  4.66 
Food grain supply  2.3  4.61 
Rice supply per capita  0.47  3.21 
Food grain supply per capita  0.148  3.063 
Import ratio of national food grain availability   10.4  10.2 
Public distribution as % of national food grain 
availability 
12.5 7.1   8
all-rice categories.
6 The seeds-water-fertilizer revolution appears to be slowing down. 
Industrialization and housing boom are also weaning land away leading to a decline in 
arable land. Rising crops yields is what Bangladesh needs now. 
2.1   PRIVATE SECTOR’S RESPONSE THROUGH CHANGING LEVELS OF    
  COMMERCIALIZATION 
Market supply for food grains per capita exhibits a strong positive trend, the main 
reason being higher than average growth in rice at 1.17% a year. Public issue of all grains 
as a percentage of availability shows a negative trend suggesting that the food 
distribution in Bangladesh has been overwhelmingly privatized following liberalization.  
The favorable supply performance has been due to a dramatic increase in the 
proportion of rice output that is marketed leading to a fairly rapid expansion in the size of 
the market (Table 3). Between 1980 and 2003, the size of the rice markets has grown by 
about 10 million tonnes. During the same period, the nominal price per ton has risen by 
Tk. 6110. As a rough approximation, in value terms, the market has grown by Tk. 61.1 
billion. In 2003, the total number of farms in Bangladesh was estimated to be 13 million. 
This translates to a per farm expansion in value terms equal to Tk. 6000 at average price 
levels prevailing during the last 20 years. This was bound to provide a powerful stimulus 
towards rice’s commercialization.  
                                                 
6 The relative levels of returns to land or family labor however still tend to be higher for the HYVs despite 
the lower yield growth rates for them.    9
Table 3—Broad changes in Bangladesh’s rice markets   
Dimension 1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  2003 
Output and its aspects        
Level (million tonnes)  10  12  15  18  23 
Boro share (%)  7  18  26  38  52 
HYV share (%)  1  23  36  63  80 
Quantity marketed        
Level (million tonnes)  1  3  5  9  15 
Percentage share in output (%)  12  27  34  49  60 
Per capita (kgs)  20  41  51  76  109 
Public share of rice supply (%)  30  15  11  7  6 
Share sold on the farm itself (%)  28  n.a.  n.a.  66  > 66 
Number of marketing agents        
No. of traders  4000  n.a.  n.a.  48000  > 48000 
Millers          
Automatic 0  3  66  88  n.a. 
Major 106  152  251  480  n.a. 
Husking mills  6049  11437  43374  50300  n.a. 
Total 6155  11592  43691  50868  n.a. 
Private rice stocks        
No. of months of consumption needs  1  n.a.  n.a.  3  n.a. 
Average storage time for trader stocks (months)  4  n.a.  n.a.  1  n.a. 
Typical distance of spatial arbitrage (miles)  50  n.a.  n.a.  100  n.a. 
  Source: Chowdhury (1992); Chowdhury and Haggblade (2000); MOF/FPMU data; authors’ own  
calculations; Note: n.a. indicates that no recent survey data are available. 
 
Several studies (Chowdhury (1992) and (Dorosh et al., 2004) have related these 
changes to the change in the structure of rice output, the rising share of irrigated rice 
which is more intensive in purchased inputs and the increase in business confidence that 
it spawned among farmers. Chowdhury (1994) showed that the rice production 
seasonality changed from being single humped in the November-January stretch to 
double humped, the other being in May-July stretch. From less than 15% in the early 
1970s, the percentage of overall rice output harvested during the boro season (May-
September) rose to more than 65% in the 1990s. The HYVs are very cash-intensive. Not 
surprisingly, they motivate greater marketed surplus. Also, as pointed out in Dorosh et   10
al., the production stabilization through the two humps increased the farmers’ economic 
confidence.  
During the quinquennium to 1969/70, 62% of the annual rice output was 
harvested in December-January while the next sizeable rice crop was harvested in 
September. Rice prices then were the lowest in December and the highest in August-
October. Three decades later, thanks to the diffusion of boro rice HYVs, the December 
harvest’s proportionate share has shrunk to under two-fifths while nearly 50% is 
harvested between May and August. A large part of that season between August–
September used to be the hungry season with high rice prices and high incidences of 
malnutrition (Chen, et al. 1979; Clay, 1981). Thanks to the large and growing boro 
harvests, that hungry season has been converted to a benign harvest season.  
In recent times, the price seasonality has become bimodal, with one peak in 
March-April and another in September and October. As seasonal price spreads have 
fallen in the late 1980s, 1990s and thereafter, storage for inter-temporal arbitrage has 
increasingly become less profitable. The typical storage period has fallen significantly, 
from about 4 months in the late 1960s to about one month in 1989/90 (Farruk, 1972, 
Chowdhury, 1992). With the reduction in duration of storage, there was a certain 
weakening of finance as a source of competitive strength.  
As the pace of urbanization increased, new growth centers came up making 
arbitrage over space more profitable. Effective distance was also shortened because of the 
development of transportation infrastructure. Satellite population centers came up outside 
two mega cities, namely, Dhaka and Chittagong. In the changed scenario, information   11
about sources and destinations, and the ability to physically negotiate the distance 
became the chief differentiator among farms. Amid the new reality, labor and not capital 
became the source of competitive strength. 
Growing farm surpluses created a new breed of traders to channel the surpluses to 
the market. Back in 1990, Chowdhury (1992) found that the farmers sold two thirds of 
their marketed output at the farm gate through marketing agents. These agents operated 
with little capital (Chowdhury and Haggblade, 2000) and probably represented one of the 
most labor intensive rice trading regimes in Asia. Importantly, the army of rice traders 
had emerged without any government initiative. Informal delivery chains including trade 
credits also emerged alongside to service the growing needs of finance of the traders with 
little personal capital (Chowdhury, 1994; Chowdhury and Haggblade, 2000). Just as there 
is evidence of no distress selling of surplus rice, there is no evidence of rent seeking in 
loan market. Again, the private sector seems to have delivered (Chowdhury and 
Haggblade, 2000). The government did play an important facilitating role by investing in 
physical infrastructure (expanding network of highways, major arteries and rural roads). 
The government initiatives on this front ensured that small and marginal farmers were a 
part of the commercial changes.
7  
Growing production of grains, an improving infrastructure and greater farmer 
confidence in marketing resulted in rising marketed surpluses, which enabled seasonal 
smoothing and spatial integration of markets. The uniformity in the seasonal pattern of 
                                                 
7 This account has been related by Chowdhury (1992, 1994), Chowdhury and Haggblade (2000).    12
marketing can be seen in Table 4. Given widespread HYV adoption by farms of all sizes, 
a large proportion of even marginal farms (those owning up to 0.2 hectare of land) 
became net sellers of paddy in good harvest years. After good aman and boro harvest 
during the 1989/90 crop year, an estimated 70% of all farms were net sellers of rice 
(Chowdhury, 1994).  
Table 4—Coarse rice and seasonality of farm rice marketing, Bangladesh, 1990 
(kgs)   
Marketing per farmer by month by grade (all milled rice) 
  Month 
Coarse rice  Non-coarse rice  % of coarse rice in total 
marketing 
November 417  156  72.7 
December 294  135  68.5 
January 219  145  60.1 
February 246  126  66.1 
March 219  150  59.4 
April 420  202  67.5 
May 915  134  87.2 
June 469  74  86.3 
July – August  591  136  81.3 
September- October  506  141  78.1 
All Months  4315  1399  76.0 
Source  : BFPP Farm Survey 
 
There is reasonable empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that food 
markets in Bangladesh are spatially integrated. If trade occurs between two markets and 
the price in the importing market equals that in the exporting market plus transport costs 
to certain approximation, then the two markets are spatially integrated. Dawson and Dey 
(2002) test for long-run spatial market integration between two prices (of rice) using a 
dynamic vector autoregressive model and cointegration. Their paper uses monthly prices   13
on wholesale rice markets in Bangladesh since trade liberalization in 1992. Following 
Ravallion (1986), Dawson and Dey (2002) assume a radial market structure where there 
is a group of local, regional markets and a central market in Dhaka. The regional markets 
chosen are those in Bogra, Comilla, Faridpur, Jessore, Khulna, Kustia, Mymensingh, 
Noakhali, Pabna, Rajshahi and Tangail. All these regional markets are within about 170 
miles by road/ferry. Trade between regional markets does exist but trade with the central 
market dominates price formation and accordingly Dawson and Dey examine 11 pair 
wise relationships between prices in Dhaka and those in regional markets. The hypothesis 
tested is that of perfect market integration where a price increase in one market leads to 
an equivalent effect in another.  
Previous studies of rice market integration in Bangladesh examine the pre-
liberalization period prior to 1992 and conclude that there is limited integration, Ahmed 
and Bernard (1989) and Goletti (1994)). Dawson and Dey (2002) in contrast find that 
since liberalization, the law of one price holds between the rice prices in Dhaka and each 
regional market and this spatial market integration is perfect so that a price change in one 
market is mirrored elsewhere. In its relationships with near markets, Dhaka is dominant 
whereas in its relationships with more distant markets, regional markets dominate.  
The IDS report (1998) titled “ The Spatial Integration and Pricing Efficiency of 
the Private Sector Grain Trade in Bangladesh” arrived at a similar conclusion albeit 
including wheat markets as well. In the study along with rice, wheat markets were also 
found to be spatially well integrated, with the extent of integration improving since 1992. 
The study attributes this spatial integration to grain market liberalization along with the   14
investments in the road and telecommunications infrastructure. This study that analyzes 
the changing marketing chains finds that millers and wholesalers in the procurement 
regions are increasingly bypassing traditional marketing intermediaries and selling 
directly to wholesalers in terminal markets. This shortening of the marketing chain has 
important implications for spatial integration of the markets.  
2.1.1  The ascendancy of the private sector  
The efficiency of the private sector is likely to be higher when the extent of 
commercialization is high, the growth of infrastructural networks is extensive, entry 
barriers are small and trading is labor-intensive so that small traders can also be a part of 
the market. In the 1990s, these enabling factors have improved. Technological change 
fostered greater commercialization but also the road kilometerage, the number of trucks, 
the number of telephone connections i.e. the availability of infrastructure went up. The 
marketing costs of suppliers at each level fell as a result of these improvements. For 
instance, in 1990, a long-distance call from Thakurgaon in the North-West of the country 
to Chittagong, an important terminal market would cost Tk. 30/minute. In 2002, such a 
call was only Tk. 6/minute. Similarly, the opening of the Jumna Bridge lowered the travel 
time between Dinajpur and Chittagong by one-half. 
The ingredients of what we prefer to call a marketing revolution were increases in 
the volume of private stocks, narrowed period of temporal arbitrage among rice traders 
and a widening of marketing outreach for an average arbitrageur. Chowdhury (1992) 
showed that per capita private rice stocks roughly doubled between 1960s and the early   15
1990s. In absolute terms, private rice stocks have grown faster, particularly since the late 
1980s. In the lean season, just before the aman harvest, private rice stocks typically 
exceed those held in government godowns by about a factor of three. During the early 
1990s, in the post-harvest months of January and June, private rice stocks alone exceed 
total government food grain stocks by a factor of five. Among private holdings, farm 
stocks dominate. On-farm stocks account for about 75% of all holdings, while trade 
stocks account for the remainder (Chowdhury, 1992).  
The main messages from Table 5 are two. First, by 1990, the marketing of rice 
had turned out to be fairly even across classes of farms and across months in the market 
year. Secondly, there is evidence for no distress selling by the farmers. If there were 
distress selling by marginal and small farmers, the percentages sold in the months away 
from the main harvest(s) would have fallen sharply compared with the harvest months. 
The clear implication is that growing rice in Bangladesh had become a profitable 
business, and that marginal and small farmers have been included in this propitious 
development.
8  
                                                 
8 Even though our finding is based on an old survey in 1990, similar conclusions have been reached by 
other authors using more recent data. Dorosh et al. (2004) write: “All farm size-classes sell at least a half of 
their rice output. The price of rice during the harvest season is therefore a major determinant of farmers’ 
incomes”.    16
Table 5—Farm marketing of paddy, the year through November 1990 (percent of 
quantity marketed) 
Farm size classes  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar Apr  May  Jun  Jul Aug  Sep Oct Total 
Marginal  Farms  11.29 11.94 7.79 12.0  2.51  15.6 15.31 8.4  8.61 3.85 1.6  0.8  100 
Small  Farms  9.41 6.13 6.15  10.6  7.09 11.1  14.11  7.1 6.65  14.1  3.9 3.2 100 
Medium  Farms  9.35 5.98 5.28  11.0  10.26  9.85  15.42  9.8 5.78  5.36  6.2 5.5 100 
Large  Farms  8.67 7.00 5.76  11.5  10.42  9.45  16.94  8.0 4.67  6.79  5.0 5.6 100 
All  Farms  8.92 6.69 5.67  11.3  10.09  9.72  16.32  8.4 5.13  6.92  5.2 5.4 100 
Source  : BFPP Farm Survey 
 
The overall private stocks had risen both in absolute terms but also relative to 
total estimated food grain stocks during 1989-1994. This is true for the stocks in October 
(the end of the kharif season), January (the end of the aman harvest season) and June (the 
peak of the boro harvest season). Private stocks relative to public food grain stocks (both 
rice and wheat) range from a low multiple of 1.25 in the month of October to a high of 
more than 4.5 during June. Private stocks supplied in 1994, on an average equate to more 
than 3 months’ of food grain requirements in Bangladesh. In the second half of the 1960s, 
this used to be one month’s requirements. 
2.2   ADAPTABILITY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN BANGLADESH RICE    
  ECONOMY 
When given an opportunity through public investment on agricultural R & D and 
physical infrastructure, the private sector delivered. Once again, when faced with an 
opportunity to take advantage of international trade, the private sector showed its mettle. 
In the wake of the disastrous flood in 1998, (large output losses in 1998/1999), the dire 
need was to augment market supplies of parboiled coarse rice quickly and cheaply.   17
Within a period of 9 months, as much as 2.4 million metric tonnes (MMT) of rice were 
imported by the private sector following the floods. Ironically, less than one year from 
the floods of 1998 and the concerns of food shortages and high prices, low rice prices 
dominated the short-term food policy debates throughout 1999-2000. Bumper crops of 
wheat and boro rice in the first half of 1999 brought large surpluses to markets leading 
the Ministry of Food to increase procurement targets. It resulted in a large build-up of 
government stocks (Dorosh et al., 2004).  
In legalizing private imports, the government was stepping across a major 
psychological barrier. There were two years when production shortfalls were large due to 
flood-induced losses to standing crops or seedbeds during the aman season in, 1995/96 
and 1998/99. On both occasions, the prices rose raising expected profits to importers. 
Immediate response by a large number of importers, each opening letters of credits 
(L/Cs) for fairly small quantities of rice helped import large quantities of rice within a 
very short period of time.
9 Importantly, the rice importers had little overlap with the 
established rice wholesalers or millers. The new opportunity triggered the entry of an 
entirely new set of marketing agents. Their large numbers ensured that the market was 
highly competitive.  
                                                 
9 IFPRI FRSMP project showed that a large proportion of the letter of credit (L/C) opened by private 
importers are small in amount, of less than 500 MT. L/Cs opened during both 1994 and 1998 suggest a 
large number of traders imports. Average quantity of rice imported per consignment fell between 1994 and 
1998. The ten largest traders imported 142,369 tonnes, 16 percent of the total. The structure of the rice 
import trade was atomistic, with very little real possibility favoring existence of price collusion among so 
many importers.    18
Since private imports were legalized, markets selected India a source of choice. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the percentages of public imports in rice and wheat have fallen 
sharply but India has remained a major source of imports. India is a next-door-neighbor, 
had a large and growing public food grain stock and was a major producer of parboiled 
rice, the variety that is preferred in Bangladesh. The Indian rice according to this enjoyed 
an advantage (in terms of the import parity price) of 10-16% over the nearest competitor 
in the period after 1998 flood. Since private imports were legalized, private importers and 
government/donors have switched their market shares. From a one third share in imports 
in the mid-1990s, private imports have become the mainstay of imports recently.  
2.3   THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC SUPPLIES OF FOOD GRAINS 
Public supply of food grains has three main sources in Bangladesh: domestic 
procurement, imports and changes in government stocks. We show the changing structure 
of relationships between issue price (IP), procurement price (PP) and wholesale market 
price (MP) of food grains. The moving averages of the ratio of procurement-to-market 
price for both grains show a significant positive time-trend. Ratios greater than unity 
point to greater government efforts to pack incentives in the PP.
10 Likewise, the ratio of 
issue price to market price too show a significant positive time-trend.  
The government’s effort to corner larger absolute quantities of rice and wheat 
through its procurement program has succeeded since the early 1990s: the quantities 
                                                 
10 A relative lowering of PP to MP also reflects the downward movements in market price itself (for 
instance, based on declining international rice prices).   19
procured have tended to increase. The proportion of wheat output intake through 
procurement took an upward turn recently and the same, albeit to a smaller degree applies 
to rice. As a result, domestic procurement has become the source of choice in feeding the 
Public Food Grain Distribution System (PFDS).  
All public supply of food grains is the preserve of the PFDS. As Table 6 shows, 
the distribution system costs the government between 3 and 4% of the total public 
expenditure. The overriding objectives behind the PFDS are: feeding priority channels; 
price stabilization; targeted interventions in poverty reduction; and security stocks. 
Between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, the share of public distribution in market 
supply shrank from 13% to 5.2%. In terms of the relative importance of the three sources 
of public supply,
11 during 1999/2000-2002/03, the share of procurement averaged 82%. 
The government has increasingly relied on domestic procurement, especially of rice, in 
the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
11 From the balance equation for stocks, we know that off take and open-market sales by the government 
are driven by changes in stocks, imports and procurement. Whenever there are discrepancies between the 
share of imputed sources and the actual, they are often due to unreported stock losses and from omissions.   20
    Table  6—Food  subsidies  relative  to  expenditures (All values are in Tk. Billions)  
Year  
 






















% of public 
Expenditure 
in India 
1999/2000 2370 181.95  152.21  344.6  3.69  n.a.  n.a.  3.03 
2000/2001 2535 205.36  159.01  374.0  3.34  8.25  4.0  2.88 
2001/2002  2732  227.0 150.5  407.6 3.35  9.47  4.2  4.41 
2002/2003  3006  253.07 169  439.04 4.64  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2003/2004 3326 289.69  203  519.8  3.03  8.77  3.0  n.a. 
      Source:  Bangladeshi numbers are from the Ministry of Finance (various years), and Indian numbers are  
     from Government of India (2002)  
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    There has been a significant decline in the role of imports. The percentage of 
imports in total public distribution had averaged 90% over the period from 1972/93 to 
1989/90 (Goletti et al., 1991). That fell to 58% during 1992/93–2002/03. If it were not for 
the large imports during 1995/96 and 1998/99 (in the wake of floods), the relative 
importance of imports would have been even smaller.  
Public distribution essentially involves two kinds of channels, sales and non-
monetized. The difference is whether supplies lead to any financial quid pro quo into the 
DGF or not. The components of priced distribution are essential priorities (EP), other 
priorities (OP), open-market sales (OMS) and Large Employers (LE).
12 EP caters to the 
employees of the Armed Forces, the para-military border forces (the BDR), the police, 
the “Ansars” (another para-police cadre of armed security men). These public servants 
are treated as special cases.
13 The issue price for this category has not been revised during 
the last ten years. EP alone accounts for the lion’s share of the food subsidy each year. 
The OP caters to the employees of Civil Defense Forces and some other strategically 
influential groups. Through LEI, the government allots grains to large registered 
manufacturing enterprises (with more than 100 employees) in the SR areas.  
Non-priced distribution is motivated by poverty-reduction objectives and includes 
programs such as food-for-work program (FFWP), vulnerable group feeding (VGF), 
                                                 
12 Statutory rationing (SR), Modified rationing (MR), Palli rationing (PR), and the monetized channels have 
been abolished. 
13 The subsidies to the EP recipients is classified information but is expected to be high. After 1992 when 
SR was abolished, EP is the only channel in which grains are shipped by the DGF at a fraction (of between 
10 and 20%) of what the DGF calls the economic price of the grain.    22
vulnerable group development (VGD), and canal digging (CD), test relief (TR), 
gratuitous relief (GR), and food for education (FFE).
14 The Food-for-education (FFE) 
introduced in December 1993 was phased out in December 2001. Under this scheme, in-
kind nutritional supplements were being given to households that had children at school. 
CD, TR, GR operate mostly after some natural calamity.  
2.3.1  Reforms in Bangladesh’s PFDS 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a spate of policy work exposing the 
inequities in the SR, MR and OP (Beacon Consultants, 1986; Chowdhury, 1988a, 1988b, 
Ahmed 1992). Two of the inequitable channels were phased out in 1990/91 and in 
1991/92 with almost no resistance from the public. Given the special interests that this 
system breeds over time, the near absence of public opposition to such a change was 
remarkable. 
The government has since been pushing rice into FFW, VGD/VGF, TR/GR, FFE, 
even canal digging. From one-tenth of total rice distribution in the 1980s, these channels 
have accounted for more than three-fifths of all public rice off take since 1997. It is 
unclear whether from a food security perspective this is a positive development or not. 
However, few considerations apply. First, in Bangladesh, rice cannot compare with 
wheat’s attractiveness as a public-intervention commodity since consumption levels of 
rice  without-intervention is likely to be high even for low-income households. Thus, any 
                                                 
14 FFE has since been abolished late in 2001. FFW also witnessed a roll-back in the quantity allotted to it in 
2002.   23
intervention quantity is almost certain to be infra-marginal. Intervention with infra-
marginal quantities leads only to an income effect when the intervention is well-targeted.  
On the other hand, if wheat is the public-intervention commodity and is well-
targeted, the impact would be extra-marginal. The changeover to rice (from wheat) in 
FFW and VGD was presumably regressive on grounds of equity. Secondly, compared 
with wheat, rice’s marketing chain is truly national. The transaction cost of selling grain 
for cash relative to unit sales is certainly higher for wheat. One possible reason for the 
selection of the grain could be the falling food aid. The government was determined to 
push ahead with domestic procurement of rice even though two channels generating retail 
demand for rice had been scrapped. It had no option but to force-feed the rice that was 
procured through the unconventional channels, despite the risks of more leakages. 
2.3.2   The cost-effectiveness of the existing system 
Cost-effectiveness refers to efficacy relative to the input, usually defined as a 
ratio, the numerator an estimate of benefits and the denominator an estimate of costs. 
Thus, cost-effectiveness measures how much does it cost to transfer a unit subsidy to 
target groups.
15  
In case of food grain interventions, this has been done in the following two main 
ways. First, studies carried out by IFPRI during 1993 provided estimates of cost-
effectiveness of income transfers from targeted interventions programs (Working Group 
                                                 
15 For an example of this approach, see Ahmed (1993).   24
on Targeted Food Interventions 1994). A variation was implemented by Ahmed who 
asked the following question to measure effectiveness: do beneficiaries of targeted 
interventions have higher marginal propensity to consume out of the dollar received as 
wheat ration compared with cash income? If they do, this would make a food-based 
program more effective in providing nutritional support than an equivalent payment in 
cash (Ahmed, 1993).  
The second approach is expounded by Bale and Lutz involving efficiency and 
deadweight losses to capture welfare effects of public interventions. Several 
qualifications apply to the usage of that methodology in the current context. Since 
1985/86, internal procurement has been a much more substantive source of grains relative 
to food aid. The rationing system has been disbanded and the PFDS has been reoriented 
towards targeted channels.  
There is also the technical difficulty of all grain being priced now by the DGF at 
economic price, thus doing away with unit subsidies. Due to these considerations, the 
Bale and Lutz framework is not the natural one to estimate cost-effectiveness. Instead, 
since targeted interventions now dominate, the framework of WGTFI and Ahmed is more 
suitable. We build on that framework and extend it further. In effect, we answer the 
question: what is the net social welfare gain from the operations by the DOF, whether 
from procuring grains domestically, distributing domestically-procured grain among 
various channels or distributing grains through either food-for-work activities or 
vulnerable group development programs.   25
In our estimate, we use distributional weights in assessing program benefits. In 
order to use distributional weights, we use data on average incomes of all kinds of 
program beneficiaries. The weights are inversely proportional to the per capita incomes 
of households in each beneficiary class. Based on our estimates, cost-effectiveness of the 
existing PFDS has improved from mid-1980s by forty percentage points. The movement 
towards targeted channels and away from the openly inequitable sales channels has 
contributed to this extremely positive development.  
3.   TRANSITION IN PRICE OF FOOD GRAINS IN BANGLADESH 
In this section, we look at the trends in cereal prices deflated by the consumer 
price index (CPI) for non-food goods in Dhaka. For both grains, the annual price 
variability has clearly fallen. Both real-prices display statistically significant negative 
trends. For rice, the negative time-trend for the period 1981-2003 is 2.57% per year, and 
for wheat the negative growth rate is 1.76%.
16 
The number of months in which trend-deviations are positive during the post 
liberalization period is 6 versus 4 during the first period. There is some clustering of 
positive shocks in coarse rice prices in the run-up to the boro-planting season between 
February and May. Both intra year and inter year fluctuations in rice prices have become 
                                                 
16 In spite of these encouraging trends, it is important to highlight that the unit cost of rice production in 
Bangladesh is high compared with other countries in the region, 62% higher than Thailand in dry season 
(Boro) and 18% in wet season (Aman), 25% and 36% higher compared to Vietnam. Compared to the 
Indian states of Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, production cost is 26 to 81% higher in Bangladesh (Deb and 
Hossain, 2003).  
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more attenuated in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s compared to the 1970s. The 
standard error of estimate around a simple time-trend fitted to nominal rice price for the 
years 1973-1993 is 0.5, it is only one-third of that in the later period. The intra-year range 
between the highest and lowest rice prices has the following results: 1973-1980, 29.2%; 
1981-1993, 17.4% and 1994-2003, 14.8%. With falling and more stable rice prices, one 
expects food security in Bangladesh to improve (from consumer’s point of view). This 
expectation is not unreal as the next section argues.   
4.   FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
INCLUDING LIBERALIZATION IN BANGLADESH 
The per-capita availability of all grains has increased in Bangladesh post-
liberalization. During the period 1973-2002, rice and wheat consumption per capita has 
averaged 147.2 and 18 kgs respectively. Overall, food grain consumption has averaged 
165.2 kgs. Government’s targeted norm for the average citizen is 165 kgs a year. In the 
pre-liberalization period, per-capita food grain availability was 158 kgs. Thus, 
liberalization has positively affected food grain consumption. For food grains as a whole, 
variability in consumption is lower than for rice and wheat individually. Variability in 
overall consumption is higher post liberalization (10.3% versus 3.4%).
17  
Below, we use the food grain intake data by income deciles from four rounds of 
Surveys (HIES), 1985, 1988, 1992 and 2000 as our basis for discussing household-level 
                                                 
17 For rice, 6 successive negative deviations from trend during 1994 – 1999 have been followed by 4 
successive positive trend deviations. It is important to remember that real grain prices had lower variability 
in the post-liberalization period.   27
food security (Table 7). Per-capita consumption of all cereals shows a declining trend 
between 1992 and 2000: from 185 to 170 kgs.
18 Per-capita consumption of rice however 
does not show any trend one way or the other. Since, per-capita incomes during the same 
time grew at a rate of 3% and the inequality in income has shrunk, the fall in average 
food grain consumption could possibly be due to other changes such as dietary 
preferences. The distribution of rice intake has indeed improved between 1992 and 2000. 
The bottom 40% consumers raised their intake while the top 20% reduced it. The Gini 
coefficient of cereals fell from 0.08 in 1992 to 0.04 in 2000.  
Having established that private sector has been largely responsible for the 
improvements in food security in Bangladesh, it leads us to the next question: does the 
private-sector compare favorably to the public-sector in the terms of efficiency? 
Table 7—Rice and cereal intake by Bangladeshi households by bottom and top 
quintiles 
 
Rice All  cereals  Year 
 
 
Bottom 40% of 
consumers 
Middle 40% of 
consumers 








1988/89 143.36  167.74  184.68  169.18  190.68  206.0 
1991/92 143.4  182.3  185.8  158.6  199.2  211.05 
1995/96 148.1  167.4  164.4  164.1  182.6  184.6 
1999/00 156.8  167.4  164.2  161.9  173.4  181.15 
Source  : Household Expenditure Surveys of BBS (Various rounds). 
 
                                                 
18 While comparison of average foodgrain availability pre- and post-liberalization points at growth, data 
from household surveys is vague regarding growth in intake levels. There is however no doubt that the 
poorest 40% of the population have increased their consumption of rice.   28
5.   ASSESSING COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC VERSUS 
PRIVATE MARKETING OF GRAINS IN BANGLADESH 
 
The measures that we use for comparing public and private sector efficiency are 
as follows: (1) unit transportation cost based on a benchmark grid of marketing routes (2) 
cost of transit and storage loss and (3) the marketing margin adjusted for marketing life-
cycles. The benchmark grid of marketing for public sector includes 20 new districts in 
Bangladesh that account for the bulk of public procurement of rice and is based on the 
movement program (MP) drawn up by the DOF for rice before the onset of the 
procurement season. The data is based on movement of grains during 2002 from actual 
shipments involving 35 marketing routes.   
The most important routes originate from rice-surplus districts in the North-west ( 
, Rangpur, Bogra, Rajshahi districts). From these districts, the rice is shipped mostly to 
the rice-deficit districts. With the exception of greater Sylhet and Comilla, the deficit 
districts are in the South that is Barisal, Khulna, Chittagong, Noakhali, and Chittagong. 
These 35 routes accounted for nearly 75% of all rice procurement during 2002. The unit 
quantity-weighted transportation cost was calculated based on actual fares, and losses, 
financing and fixed costs in DGF distribution. For the PFDS as a whole, the distribution 
cost of rice on a full-cost basis is 21% of the procurement price.  
There are notable similarities in the public and private sector marketing-grids for 
rice. Bogra and Rajshahi are the grain arteries for both the public and the private sector. 
For the private-sector, marketing margins range between Tk. 2020 a ton to Tk. 2620 a   29
ton. For the public sector the corresponding number in 2002 was Tk 2450 on average 
(See Table 8 for comparing the marketing spreads between private and public sector).  
Table 8—Comparative marketing spreads of private trade and the DGF  (All prices 
are Tk/ton) 
 
Marketing spread as 
% of farm-gate price  
Terminal 
Markets 
Retail price in 2002 
 
Private-sector 
marketing spread for 
rice, 2002  Private trade  DGF 
Khulna 13000  2260  21.04 19.8 
Dhaka 13220  2100  18.88  19.5 
M’Singh 12950  2020  18.48  19.3 
Faridpur 13240  2260  20.58  19.3 
Barisal 13290  2430  22.38 21.1 
Chittagong 13540  2620  20.69  22.0 
Noakhali 13460  2450  22.25  20.9 
Comilla 13060  2470  23.32  20.1 
Sylhet 13080  2620  25.04  25.1 
All   13240  2360  21.69  20.8 
Source  : Calculated by the authors. 
 
As a percentage of farm-gate prices, marketing margin in private trade is slightly 
higher, at 21.7%.
19 In comparing these margins, few considerations apply. First, DGF is 
much larger in terms of capitalization, scale of operations and geographical coverage. It 
also enjoys a more favorable regime of input prices and is an insider within regulatory 
and donor institutions.
20The DGF maintains 5 to 7 months expected requirements. The 
                                                 
19 One conjecture for the falling private marketing spreads is the opening of the Jamuna bridge in 1999 that 
cut travel time by more than 40%. The second reason is the growing competition that is reflected in a rising 
number of merchants. 
20 In 2001, the DGF implemented construction of modern storage depots throughout the country, mostly 
funded by food-aid donors. These have possibly lowered the storage costs of the DGF while leaving the 
costs of private storage unaffected.      30
rice stocks of the entire private sector are for no more than two-five weeks requirements. 
The DGF is also favored at the lending windows of state-owned banks.  
Finally, an effect that has not been discussed in the literature and that we allude to 
is the detrimental effect of the government stocks on the on the private stocks. The 
conjecture is that the excessive stocks with the government have a potentially dampening 
effect on the expected prices that in turn shortens the storage tenure of the private traders. 
In an anticipated equilibrium, expected future prices lead to a dampening of the price in 
the current period itself. In that sense, the procurement activity of the government aimed 
at securing price support for the farmers can work at cross purposes. 
Since the government’s procurement policy is likely to be working at cross 
purposes and private sector is nearly as efficient in spite of the playing field not being 
level, there is a need to reform the procurement system by limiting it to be a price support 
policy and not a persistent source of stocks. Also, the PFDS continues to involve a 
significant drain on public resources and changes are due on that front.  
Government’s involvement with procurement is commonly argued to be 
excessive. In Bangladesh, the boro rice crop bears the brunt of the procurement drive, 
much of it happening between the wet months of May through September. Monthly 
indent for rice for sales channels have fallen to between 60 and 80 thousand MT on an 
average. During the boro procurement season, the DGF has on average bought 150 
thousand MT. During the wet season there is no way the government can pump out rice 
through the FFW channel. The FFW work typically is a dry-season activity, done during 
December through April. Public rice stocks thus accumulate and eventually decay to be   31
of sub-standard quality. Meanwhile new procurement season arrives leading to a 
reinforcement of the stocks. 
Since 94% of the consumer demand is met by the market, market prices should be 
the basis of the calculation of subsidies. We extend the results from two recent IFPRI 
studies, Dorosh and Farid (2003) and Ahmed at al. (2004) in assessing the costs and 
benefits of the PFDS operations. With estimates based on market prices, the level of 
consumer subsidies during 2003/2004 was Tk 7.3 billion. This estimate is about 30% 
higher than in 2001,
21 largely because market prices during 2003/2004 were higher, while 
all administered prices had not been raised. The producer subsidy is estimated at Tk 1.4 
billion, only 64% that of the level in 2001. This is almost entirely because of the fact that 
despite its best attempts, the government was virtually unable to procure any wheat in 
2003/2004.  
IFPRI’s recent research shows that even within current pricing and distributional 
outcomes, the government can run the system at a lower cost. When net stock increases 
to 0.8 million tonnes, keeping the distribution level identical to the base scenario, the 
amount of old stock increases from 332 tonnes to 908 tonnes. This leads to a loss with a 
benefit/cost ratio equal to -14%. With the closure of FFE (about 350 thousand tonnes) 
and downsizing of the PFDS operation, such as the FFW program (more than 200 
                                                 
21 Rice prices globally were rising during 2003 and 2004, in a process of rebounding from the historical 
lows reached during 2000 and 2001. Thus for instance the price of benchmark Thai 100% white rice during 
2003 and 2004 were, respectively, US dollar 240 and 280 per MT, while the corresponding prices during 
2000 and 2001 were US dollars 180 and 195. Global stocks had also made a marked increase during 
2003/04 compared with 2000/01. Unsurprisingly, prices in Bangladesh too were much higher during 
2003/2004 than during either of the earlier years cited in the foregoing.    32
thousand tonnes) in 2002, the ideal PFDS stock level and its distribution should be 0.6 
and 1.35 million tonnes, respectively. Ahmed et al. (2004) reported that the benefit-cost 
ratio of managing 0.6 million tonnes of food grain could be as high as 74%, as against a 
negative benefit-cost ratio of –14%. The implicit cost of holding greater stock is 
substantially higher, about $15 million at 2002 exchange rate.  
To summarize, as market prices in Bangladesh stage a comeback into the 
2004/2005 from the lows reached during 2000 and 2001, the true burden of the country’s 
PFDS will undoubtedly rise. Importantly, the prices are most likely to rise even further 
due to the prospective effects of the Doha Round.    33
6.   ASSESSING MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFECT ON 
GLOBAL FOOD GRAIN PRICES 
This section assesses the likely impact of the Doha Round, if successfully 
concluded, on food security in Bangladesh. A multi-market model that distinguishes 
several household types is used to study the impacts on real incomes and food 
consumption of the poor in Bangladesh due to anticipated changes in world price of rice 
and wheat from multilateral trade liberalization under the Doha Round. This analysis is  
supplemented with a review of a recent study that analyzes the impacts of trade 
liberalization on poverty in Bangladesh using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model.  
6.1   MULTI-MARKET MODEL ANALYSIS  
We employ a multi-market (MM) model originally developed in 1994 (Dorosh 
1994; Dorosh and Haggblade 1995). This model distinguishes 13 commodities: rice, 
wheat, pulses, fruits and vegetables, potatoes, onions, fish, meat, milk, oils, sugar, other 
food, and nonfoods. It also distinguishes five household types: urban poor, urban 
nonpoor, rural landless, rural small farm, and rural large farm. The model differentiates 
net-producers (large farmers) from net consumers, allowing for differential consumption 
responses to price shocks. The demand side for each market distinguishes between 
consumption out of in-kind and cash income with elasticities taken from Ahmed (1993) 
and Goletti (1993).    34
On the supply side, the model allows endogenous production responses to output 
price using supply elasticities estimated by Rahman and Yunus (1993). Price formation in 
the model differs for traded and nontraded commodities. For traded commodities, the CIF 
import price sets the domestic price level with net imports adjusting to clear the market. 
For nontraded commodities, prices adjust to equilibrate domestic production, 
consumption, and changes in stocks. For details about the model structure, the baseline, 
the standard-of-living in Bangladesh’s rural and urban areas for the five underlying 
economic classes in the model see Goletti (1993), Dorosh (1994), Dorosh and Haggblade 
(1995).  
We continue to use the same set of elasticities as in the original model, but do 
update some exogenous parameters. We run simulations wherein the world price of rice 
and wheat are shocked to reflect the effect of multilateral trade reforms. A pertinent issue 
here is the extent to which the world price of rice and wheat are expected to change 
following multilateral trade reforms. A recent study by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) using global computable general equilibrium models found that  
with full liberalization under the Doha Round, the world rice price would change by 
10.1% and by 18.1% for wheat. Since these values are based on a model that does not 
admit of positive supply response to initial price increases, and negative aggregate-
demand response, these estimates may well be an upper bound..
22  The need to carry out 
                                                 
22All the more so, because WTO bound tariffs will offer quite a bit of flexibility, even under the total 
multilateral liberalization.    35
alternative sets of model simulation based on both the upper and lower bounds is 
imperative.  
Accordingly, we shock the multi-market model of Bangladesh with upper and 
lower bounds of the estimates of the effect of multilateral trade liberalization on world 
prices. Table 9 reports the results of the simulations on real incomes and foodgrain 
consumption of rural and urban poor, measured in kcal/day in Bangladesh.  
Results indicate that the real incomes fall except for the most well-off rural 
income class across all simulations. At the upper bound increase in world price of both 
rice and wheat (Simulation 5), real incomes of the rural large farm households rise by 
about 1.5%, while the urban poor and rural landless lose nearly 2% of their real incomes. 
This follows from large farmers being net-producers for whom the increase in domestic 
price in line with increase in world prices raises their revenues. The increase in world 
price of wheat has much larger effect on real incomes than the increase in world price of 
rice (Simulations 1 and 3). These changes (rise / loss) in the real income across household 
types are roughly halved when the increase in the world prices are at their lower bound 
(Simulation 6). In terms of calorie intake, however, all households witness a decline. 
Expectedly, the decline is highest amongst urban poor and rural landless, by 65 and 40 
calories per capita per day, respectively.    36
Table 9—Simulations 1-6, higher world grain prices with liberalized trade  
  Simulation 1  Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5  Simulation 6
Real Incomes 
Urban  poor  -0.922 -0.45 -1.544 -0.62 -1.977 -0.93 
Urban  Nonpoor  -0.4655  -0.225  -1.08 -0.29 -1.25 -0.61 
Rural  Landless  -0.79  -0.38 -1.357 -0.53 -1.836 -0.89 
Rural Small Farm  -0.17  -0.09  -0.506  -0.22  -0.576  -0.29 
Rural  Large  Farm  0.91 0.48  0.987  0.25 1.47 0.73 
Calories (absolute change, kcal / capita / day) 
Urban  poor  -13.7  -7.0  -51.8 -0.23 -65.1 -27.0 
Urban Nonpoor  -7.84  -4.0  0.0  0.0  -7.84  -0.39 
Rural  Landless  -13.0  -7.2  -28.1 -0.12 -40.2 -21.5 
Rural Small Farm  -8.16  -3.80  7.5  3.0  -1.1  -0.57 
Rural  Large  Farm  -9.215 -4.4 -20.07 -9.1  -28.8 -11.0 
Note: Simulation 1 – 10% increase in world price of rice.  
   Simulation 2 – 5% increase in world price of rice.  
   Simulation 3 – 18% increase in world price of wheat.  
   Simulation 4 – 7% increase in world price of wheat.  
   Simulation 5 – 10% and 18% increase in world price of rice and wheat, respectively.  
   Simulation 6 – 5% and 7% increase in world price of rice and wheat, respectively.  
 
The above results capture the impact of trade liberalization only in rice and wheat. 
The Doha round has a more ambitious agenda covering all agriculture and also non-
agriculture including services. The multi-market model cannot capture the impact of 
more widespread trade reforms, both unilaterally by Bangladesh and multilaterally. An 
analytical framework that is typically used for such analysis is the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. Next, we summarize a recent study by Annabi et al. (2005) 
that has examined the impacts of trade liberalization on poverty in Bangladesh using a 
CGE model.  
6.2   RESULTS FROM COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS  
The study by Annabi et al. (2005) uses a sequential dynamic CGE model based on 
the social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 1999-2000. The model, solved over a 20   37
period time horizon, generates “steady state” paths that help in quantifying both the short 
run (mainly allocative effects) and long-run (both allocative and factor accumulation 
effects) impacts of trade liberalization. The study finds that trade liberalization could 
have different and often opposite impacts in the short- and in the long-run, clearly 
demonstrating the need for analyzing these effects in a dynamic framework.  
The entire model can be viewed as a series of static CGE models that are linked 
across periods by updating procedures for various endogenous and exogenous variables. 
The model distinguishes nine household categories, five in the rural areas based on 
occupation and land-ownership status (Landless, Marginal Farmer, Small Farmer, Large 
Farmer, Non-agricultural) and four in the urban areas based on education level (Illiterate, 
Low-Educated, Medium-Educated, High-Educated).  
The other agents in the model are firms (one representative firm per sector), the 
government and the rest of the world. The model distinguishes four types of primary 
factors, skilled and unskilled labor, agricultural and non-agricultural capital, and assumes 
full mobility for both types of labor across the fifteen commodity producing sectors in the 
model. Production is modeled as a nested Leontief-CES structure that generates demands 
for the primary factors and intermediate inputs, which are further distinguished between 
domestically produced and imported ones. Households receive income from factor 
payments, and transfers from firms, government and rest of world. They pay direct taxes, 
save a fixed proportion of their disposable income, and their commodity demands are 
represented through a linear expenditure system. The model allows for imperfect 
substitutability of domestically produced goods and their imported counterparts and   38
between exports and local sales for the domestically produced goods. Government levies 
direct tax on households and indirect tax on firms and on imports. Its expenditure 
includes consumption of goods and services and transfers. Government budget 
equilibrium is met by a neutral tax adjustment. The nominal exchange rate is the 
numeraire in each period. For each period, the population (labour supply), government 
consumption and savings, and current account balance are fixed, and these variables are 
updated exogenously from one period to the next. Capital stock, on the other hand is 
updated endogenously based on a investment demand function.  
Annabi et al. (2005) study the impact of a unilateral trade liberalization by 
Bangladesh and also the case when reforms in Bangladesh are a part of a process of 
multilateral trade liberalization.
23 The main findings are as follows:  
•  Unilateral elimination of tariffs by Bangladesh has a negative impact on both GDP 
and welfare in the short-run, but a strong positive impact on both in the long-run.  
•  Tariff elimination results in strong reductions in domestic import prices, particularly 
in the case of petroleum, other industry, livestock, forestry, chemicals and leather (in 
excess of 15%). There is no clear agriculture-industry distinction, as both these 
sectors contain several sub-sectors with high and low initial tariff rates.  
                                                 
23 They also study three other scenarios (i) the Doha round trade reforms that allow for reductions in tariffs, 
subsidies and domestic support in the rest of world along with special and differentiated treatment of 
Bangladesh (an LDC), (ii) full trade liberalisation in the rest of world, and (iii) increase in remittances into 
Bangladesh reflecting increased international mobility of labor. These scenarios address issues that are 
outside the scope of interest here.    39
•  Import competition forces a reduction in domestic prices as well, and consequently 
there is a fall in overall consumer prices both for rural and urban households (ranging 
between 5.5% to 24.6% in the long-run).  
•  Firms across sectors respond differently to the decline in domestic prices. In sectors 
with high initial tariffs such as petroleum, chemicals, machinery, and other industry, 
there is a contraction of output (7.8% to 58.8% in the long-run). On the other hand in 
sectors that had low initial tariffs such as commercial crops, rice-ata milling, and 
ready-made garments, firms reorient their production towards the export market 
resulting in an expansion of both exports and output (1.2% to 19.4% in the long-run).  
•  Over time there is reallocation of non-agricultural capital and labor to the textiles/ 
garments sector away from the other manufacturing sectors, with relatively little 
movement within the agricultural sectors. As a result, the above impacts (increase/ 
decrease) on imports, exports and output are stronger in the long-run than in the 
short-run.  
•  The decline in product prices results in a decline in factor prices as well (5.2% to 
27.8% in the long-run), though the decline in the long-run is less than in the short-run. 
Between labor and capital, the returns to capital fall more than for labor due to the 
contraction of several industrial sectors. Within labor, the wage rate for unskilled 
labor declines less than for skilled labor due to the expansion of labor-intensive 
textile-garments sector.    40
•  The decline in factor returns results in a fall in the nominal income of households 
(5.2% to 6.8% in the long-run), less so in the long-run than in the short-run. The 
decline is smallest amongst the poorest households (urban-illiterate, urban-low 
educated, rural-landless and rural-marginal), who get mostly unskilled wages. 
Households that get income from skilled labor and non-agricultural capital (Medium- 
and High-educated urban households, and non-agricultural rural households) are the 
biggest losers.  
•  In terms of real consumption, all households suffer a decline in the short-run 
(between 0.1% to 0.7%) as nominal income falls more than consumer prices. In the 
long-run, however, all households gain (0.6% to 1.8%) with the poorest households 
emerging as the biggest winners. Welfare measures too show similar movements 
across households, and between the short- and long-run.  
•  On expected lines, all measures of poverty show that unilateral trade liberalization 
increases poverty in the short-run while in the long-run it declines for all household 
types.  
•  The scenario where trade reforms  are  part of global (multilateral) reforms;  trade 
reforms by Bangladesh are more important for Bangladesh than reforms in the rest-
of-world. The impacts at the macro level in terms of GDP and welfare are similar in 
nature, but the adverse impacts on welfare and poverty are higher in the short-run, 
while the long-run gains are somewhat lower. Amongst households, large farmers 
emerge as the principal beneficiaries of free world trade.    41
7. CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh’s food-policy between 1980 and 2000 has witnessed momentous 
changes. However, there were changes that occurred outside of food policy which were 
extremely relevant for creating the right initial conditions for subsequent policy changes. 
One change was the plant-breeding research in rice. The second was the development of 
physical infrastructure. In the backdrop of these developments, several far reaching 
changes occurred in food policy. To begin with, there was the abandoning of the 
inequitable food grains distribution channels. Importantly, the government faced no 
backlash for such belt-tightening. Consequently, currently more than three-quarters of all 
food grains publicly distributed accrues to the poor. Following this, the government 
traversed a major psychological barrier by legalizing private imports of fertilizer in 1992 
and then of food grains in 1993.  
As government provided the environment with infrastructure and policy, markets 
swung into action. Irrigated acreage rose sharply. Food grain production and availability 
per capita and yields rose as well.  Consequently, the import dependency for food grains 
fell significantly from 12% in 1980 to 5.5% in 2004. 
The cropping-pattern effect led to a two-peak harvest seasonality pattern. The 
advent of an automatic stabilizer became a foil to undue production and harvest 
variability raising the degree of economic confidence of the peasantry in a rice-dominated 
rural economy. HYV rice was also more intensive in cash costs. This translated into a 
need for raising marketed surplus. The size of the marketed rice surplus over the last 
quarter century grew at twice the rate of output growth. Small and marginal farmers were   42
very much a part of this propitious development. Selling seasonality was moreover 
evenly spread over the months in a crop-year i.e. there was no distress selling. 
This marketing revolution was made possible by both the technology and the role 
of the government in building infrastructure. Private sector delivered yet again, importing 
large quantities of rice after a devastating flood in 1998. A completely new collection of 
traders, with no overlap with merchants in rice milling and wholesaling, entered the 
market. The trademark of these new breed of traders was their network of market 
contacts in important source countries, especially India.  
Trading very soon became extremely competitive given the low entry barriers. 
Most of them opened Letters of Credit (L/C) for fairly small quantities of rice to be 
imported. They also invested in stocks for the shortest possible time. They also imported 
at a relatively short noticeLiberalization led to a nearly complete replacement of the 
public imports by the private.  
The public sector too responded to the policy transition. Statutory food grain 
subsidies were abolished. The proportion of market supply sourced from the PFDS fell 
from 12% in the early 1980s to 6% in the early 2000s. Prioritization of poverty reduction 
led to a significant pro-poor focus of the PFDS. Distribution sensitive estimates of cost-
effectiveness show an increase from a low of 55% in the mid-1980s to 90% in 
1999/2000. This change resulted from a realignment of the PFDS from an inequitable, 
urban-leaning to targeted rural-leaning channels, such as the Food-for-Works (FFW) and 
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) programs.    43
Public procurement has replaced imports as the mainstay for public distribution. 
The procurement policy is one area where the government is yet to bring in substantial 
reform. Out of a marketed surplus of nearly15 MMT of rice, recent procurement has been 
less than 6%. The bulk of the procurement takes place during the wet boro season, when 
off take of grains from the PFDS becomes sluggish. The rotation of stocks thus leads to 
overstocking. Based on estimates from different studies the government stocks are 
excessive. 
The outcomes from liberalization have been impressive on several fronts. Real 
prices (nominal price relative to the price index) of both grains fell markedly. The 
seasonal fluctuations have also been more muted. The range between the seasonal high 
and seasonal low narrowed between the 1980s and the 2000s. Secondary evidence also 
shows greater spatial integration of markets post liberalization. The bottom 40% of the 
population closed the gap in per-capita rice consumption vis-à-vis the top 20%. In light of 
favorable outcomes from the private sector, estimates show that the public and the private 
sectors are nearly identically efficient.   
Rolling back border protection and phasing out all export subsidies is estimated to 
raise world rice price by about 22% by 2013, and wheat prices by a little over 10%. It is 
shown using a multi-market model that these shocks are likely to translate into falling 
real incomes, food grain intake and calorie consumption by two most vulnerable groups 
in Bangladesh, the urban poor and the rural landless. It is also shown that real incomes of 
the large farmers increase as a result of trade liberalization   44
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